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Abstract Many transport organizations now regard regular employees as important contributors
to their security strategies. For this reason, it is essential to understand the interaction between
service and security tasks. There is empirical evidence, for example, that workers under pressure
to be punctual make more errors in the performance of safety procedures. It is therefore useful to
determine whether punctuality goals have a similar effect on the performance of security proce-
dures. This article reports a study conducted on a metropolitan rail system driving simulator to test
whether train drivers also ‘take shortcuts’ in the perfomance of security procedures when placed
under pressure of punctuality. Four hypotheses were tested using performance measures of two
groups of 10 participants. The results show that there is a conﬂict not only between service and
security goals, but also between safety and security goals.
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Introduction
Following the derailment of a train that killed four passengers and injured more than 70
others in New York City, the Federal Railroad Administration (2014) carried out a 60-day
safety assessment of the operator’s activities. The report submitted to the US Congress
identiﬁed ‘over-emphasis of on-time performance’ as a key risk factor. This ﬁnding is
consistent with current research on large and complex organizations, where workers
who face a constant competition between following safety rules and working against the
clock to fulﬁl production-related goals take shortcuts in the performance of certain tasks
(Pate-Cornell and Murphy, 1996; Zohar, 2002; Zohar and Luria, 2005; Veltri et al, 2013).
The study reported in this article was conducted to determine if these ﬁndings were
directly applicable to security procedures – security scripts or crime control scripts (Borrion,
2013) – performed by railway employees working under a time constraint. Human error
research in security procedures has been limited for two reasons. First, many of the security
systems have only been recently employed following a surge in terrorist incidents in the last
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few decades (White, 2011). Safety research on the other hand has a long tradition that can be
traced back to the 1930s. Second, data from security procedures is not easily available to
researchers because it is often sensitive or deemed classiﬁed. As a result empirical research
on human and organizational factors in security procedures has been piecemeal and focused
primarily on security screening operators’ skills and cognitive processes in passenger air
travel (Kraemer et al, 2009).
Of particular interest to this study were the security Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) that train drivers are asked to implement when a suspicious item is reported on a
moving train. The utility of this study was found in the fact that terrorist attacks using
explosives form a continuing and serious threat to urban commuter rail networks (Wilson
et al, 2007; Government Accountability Ofﬁce, 2010; Jenkins et al, 2010; O’Neill et al,
2011), and several Metro Rail Systems (MRSs) worldwide rely on ordinary employees who
have many other tasks to respond to security threats to the transport network.
Trade-offs between service and safety goals
Trade-offs between safety and production goals can take place for several reasons. Resource
constraints and environmental factors of certain working conditions, in particular, make it
impractical for workers to meet safety and production goals at the same time. For example,
operators may be expected to work faster, but the nature of the task means that they cannot
maintain safety standards at higher throughput rates (Marais and Saleh, 2008). Ford and
Tetrick (2008) hypothesised that in such circumstances workers can either follow a
procedure to fulﬁl safety goals or maximize production but they cannot do both.
The movement towards taking higher safety risk in working procedures because of
increasing pressure from performance or operational goals has been studied by a number of
researchers in the ﬁeld of human error research. McLain (1995, p. 1731) suggested that
workers can be safe only when there is slack on the shop ﬂoor because ‘safety represents an
additional task that can affect performance when the sum of required tasks exceeds attention
or performance capacity’.
Therefore, in operational terms workers with high production pressures are unlikely to
work safely because they start taking shortcuts on certain tasks to free their mental and
physical resources to meet production tasks (Veltri et al, 2013).
Rasmussen (1999) observed that instructions and written procedures for working safely
are almost never followed exactly when operators strive to become more efﬁcient and more
productive, and to deal with time and other sources of pressure. Rasmussen (1999, p. 42)
noted that ‘the stage for an accidental course of events very likely is prepared through time
by the normal efforts of many actors in their respective daily work context, responding to the
standing request to be cost-effective’.
Rasmussen’s concept of movement towards the boundaries of safe behaviour under
production pressure was referred to as ‘practical drift’ by Snook (2002). Hollnagel coined the
metaphor ‘Efﬁciency-Thoroughness Trade-Off’ to explain that actors have to balance
efﬁciency requirements of production goals and thoroughness in following safety procedures
(Hollnagel, 2004, 2012; Rosness et al, 2012). In his noted work on human reliability,
Hollnagel (2004 observed that operators genuinely try to do what is expected of them in
following safety procedures, but at the same time they want to do it without what they
perceive as unnecessary effort, or waste of time.
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Workers also make trade-offs between safety and production goals in socio-technical
ﬁelds when the work procedure gives them freedom to choose the tasks they perform, the
order in which to perform them, and to put certain tasks on hold in order to complete others.
Rasmussen (1999) explained that work situations give workers the ﬂexibility to meet their
objectives in multiple ways, and they use their subjective, situation-dependent judgment to
choose the path of least resistance.
Therefore as part of this study, a questionnaire based on an 11-point Likert scale was
added to reﬂect the current philosophy in human error research that an in-depth analysis of
practitioners’ own interpretation of tasks and errors is needed to comprehensively understand
error in dynamic work procedures (Dekker and Pruchnicki, 2013). This is especially relevant
when workers can make choices about which tasks they want to perform, in which order they
want to perform them, and put certain tasks on hold for indeﬁnite periods of time without
affecting the basic integrity of the work process. In a widely cited study, Hollnagel and
Amalberti (2001) asked observers to count human error in air trafﬁc control (ATC)
operations using a previously developed taxonomy. They found that a number of actions
that were counted as errors by observers were not recorded as errors by ATC operators. The
latter saw several departures from the taxonomy as deliberate strategies to manage an
unforeseen problem during ATC operations.
Conceptual model: Safety, security and services
In order to assess whether the above ﬁndings apply to security procedures, it is essential to
understand the place of security in the safety-versus-production models introduced above.
Infrastructures and other large urban systems are generally developed to provide users
with extra capability. The primary goal of a system can therefore be regarded as the provision
of the sought capability through the delivery of core business operations, for example,
service tasks such as driving the train in the case of a MRS.
Operational procedures are designed with a number of assumptions about the character-
istics of the transport system (including the infrastructure and staff), its users and its
environment. In order to maintain these characteristics within their acceptable operational
range, MRSs implement additional security and safety procedures.
From this point of view, safety and security goals can be regarded as secondary goals that
are both concerned with protection of valuable elements from harm (Piètre-Cambacédès and
Bouissou, 2013; Raspotnig and Opdahl, 2013). In MRSs the objectives of the stakeholders
include the state of the transport system (for example, the equipment) and the employees, the
state of those who (may) interact with it (for example, passengers and their property), and the
effect of the system on its environment.
Safety and security measures are all aimed at reducing the likelihood and severity of harm
(Raspotnig and Opdahl, 2013). From the employees’ perspective, the main categories of
measures are:
● Those aimed at controlling the state of the system using direct means (for example,
replacing faulty parts with more reliable ones, hardening train carriages)
● Those aimed at controlling the state of the system indirectly by inﬂuencing the way
employees operate it (for example, reducing the maximum speed limit when the
environmental conditions are poor)
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● Those aimed at controlling the inﬂuence of external components (for example, removing
leaves on tracks, removing suspicious unattended bags onboard).
All three categories can include measures designed to reduce the probability of an unwanted
event threatening the system, and the vulnerability of the system to this event. However, the
essential difference between safety and security is that safety deals with accidental harm,
while security deals with malicious harm. The adverse consequences of both safety and
security incidents may be the same, but what distinguishes them is the absence or presence of
malicious intent.
This difference has several implications. First, the likelihood of a malicious actor
threatening the system is generally very low, whereas systemic and environmental factors
of safety risks are everywhere. Second, the causal relationship between service tasks and
safety risk is relatively evident. Safety becomes a concern as soon as employees operate the
system, and safety risk generally increases as the level of performance (for example,
velocity) increases (Veltri et al, 2013). In the contrary, the causal inﬂuence of service
tasks on security risk is less obvious. Service tasks seem to have a limited impact on the
security threats to MRSs, and their vulnerability to those. Furthermore, staff training
focuses a lot more on the relationship between service tasks and safety than service tasks
and security. For this reason, civilian staff may consider their involvement in security
procedures as a separate role, disconnected from their main function in the organisation
(Jenkins et al, 2010).
One similarity between safety and security that is relevant to the present study is that
both are perceived as ‘eternal killjoys’ by workers where ‘security and safety share a
common burden: they both imply guarding against high consequence events which are
essentially negative (attacks, accidents) in contrast to desired outcomes, which are essen-
tially positive (services delivered, goods produced)’ (Piètre-Cambacédès and Bouissou,
2013, p. 114).
In a MRS, employees at the sharp end of operations are expected to perform a range of
tasks to deliver the core services of their organisation (for example, driving the train). We
know from studies presented in the paper that staff take shortcuts in completing certain tasks
when they work under time constraints. In the same veine as McLain’s (1995) work, a
security procedure could be considered as an additional set of tasks that can affect
performance when the sum of required tasks exceeds attention or performance capacity.
This led to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Drivers will commit errors in the conduct of security SOPs.
Inspired by the opening example, this study was conducted to understand how on-time
performance might affect the performance of security procedures. The main question
investigated was whether pressure of punctuality has a similar effect on performance
of security procedures by ordinary employees of a MRS. This led to our second
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Emphasizing on-time performance will increase the number of errors
made by drivers in the conduct of security SOPs.
Finally, we investigated whether the errors made by train drivers could be attributed to
rational decisions. This led to two more hypotheses, Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, under
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the assumption that security was considered as a secondary goal in comparison with service
goals such as punctuality:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Emphasizing on-time performance will increase the number of errors
made by drivers in the conduct of the SOP tasks that hinder punctuality.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Emphasizing on-time performance will reduce the number of errors made
by drivers in the conduct of the SOP tasks that support punctuality.
There are several reasons why these hypotheses could be incorrect. In spite of many
similarities, it could be inappropriate to consider security and safety as conceptually
equivalent: malicious elements are far less likely to be present in MRSs than internal and
external factors that could contribute to unintended failures and accidents; and service tasks
have a lot less inﬂuence on security risk than on safety risk. However, these differences are
limited in the particular case investigated in this study, as the latter concerns high-risk
situations following the detection of an unattended bag onboard.
Context of the research
AMRS network in a large metropolitan city in South Asia cooperated in this study as part of
a wider, long-term research into security procedures on MRS networks. Railway companies
rely on front line railway staff – or ‘civilian staff’ as coined by Jenkins and Gersten (2001) –
to carry out security procedures for two reasons. First, its members usually receive initial
reports of suspicious activities from passengers on the network (Jenkins and Gersten, 2001).
Second, it is a cost effective way for them to respond to a large number of reports of threats
every year (Hartong et al, 2008).
In the network where the study took place, train drivers are expected to follow a speciﬁc
security SOP whenever a passenger reports a suspicious item on the train. This 20-step
procedure was designed for train drivers to assist the management of the item (usually its
removal) through coordination with members of the Operations Control Centre (OCC) and
the station team. The SOP was designed to ensure that suspicious items are dealt with in an
acceptable time under operational circumstances. The drivers underwent classroom training
to memorize the SOP and took written exams where the SOP was part of the coursework.
Finally, they repeatedly rehearsed this procedure in a train driving simulator along with other
technical, and safety SOPs.
Table 1 lists the 20 steps of the SOP, the description of the actions, and the rationale for
their inclusion. The procedure is initiated after a passenger reports a suspicious item on the
train to the driver using the passenger emergency communication unit (PECU) available in
each coach. The driver then gathers speciﬁc pieces of information about the item from the
passenger, and passes it on to the OCC. The latter conveys the same information to the
members of the security team present at the next station. With this information, the security
team can quickly locate the item and remove it from the train. If they feel the risk is too great,
they ask the bomb disposal squad to deal with it.
Train punctuality is an important operational goal that train drivers are required to satisfy
in their conventional role (Olsson and Haugland, 2004). If trains are delayed on the MRS
then the whole network could be thrown out of schedule, which in turn would have negative
commercial consequences for the railway company (Borrion et al, 2014). Under the train
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Table 1: Details of actions and their purpose in the 20-step security procedure
Task
number
Action Description of action Purpose of action
T1 Answer call Driver receives call from passenger Driver becomes aware that there is a suspicious item on the train and can
initiate the procedure for its removal
T2 Ask coach Driver asks passenger for the coach number in which the
suspicious item is located
Driver has information that will assist station team to position itself at the right
place on the platform to enter the coach with suspicious item
T3 Ask Position Driver asks passenger where is the suspicious item located
in the coach (in front, middle or rear of coach)
Driver has information that will assist station team to locate the suspicious item
in the coach
T4 Ask description Driver asks passenger for description of the suspicious
item (for example, its size, colour, whether it is a bag or
a box)
Driver has information that will assist station team to identify the suspicious
item in the coach
T5 Make manual passenger
announcement
Driver makes an announcement requesting passengers to
move away from the suspicious item
Minimise chances of passengers triggering an explosive device by touching it,
and minimise casualties in case it is detonated
T6 Keep PECU on
‘Suspend’ mode
Driver does not end his call with the passenger, and keeps
communication unit in a suspended (on hold) mode.
Driver has the option of calling the passenger back to request more information
about the suspicious item
T7 Call OCC Driver calls the OCC to inform them that a suspicious
item has been reported on the train
OCC becomes aware that there is a suspicious item on the train and can initiate
the procedure for its removal
T8 Give coach to OCC Driver gives OCC the coach number in which the
suspicious item is located
OCC has information that will assist station team to position itself at the right
place on the platform to enter the coach with suspicious item
T9 Give position to OCC Driver gives OCC the location of the suspicious item in
the coach (in front, middle or rear of coach)
OCC has information that will assist station team to locate the suspicious item
in the coach
T10 Give description to OCC Driver gives OCC description of the suspicious item (for
example, its size, colour, whether it is a bag or box)
OCC has information that will assist station team to identify the suspicious
item in the coach
T11 Request instructions
from OCC
Driver requests instructions from OCC Upon request from driver for further instructions, OCC informs driver that




















T12 Follow new ‘Target
Speed’ to station
Driver increases the speed of the train to a maximum of
80 km/h
Time for the train to reach the next station is minimized, so that the procedure
to remove suspicious item at the station can start
T13 Call passenger back on
PECU
Driver uses the PECU kept on suspend mode to speak to
the passenger who reported the suspicious item
Driver can ask the passenger for any additional information about the
suspicious item (for example, have the passengers moved away from the
suspicious item?)
T14 Give new information to
OCC
Driver gives additional information about the suspicious
item to OCC
OCC has additional information that it can communicate to station team
T15 Stop at station (no
overshoot/undershoot)
Driver stops the train at the station without overshooting
or undershooting the stop point
Time is not wasted in stopping the train as train does not have to be reversed or
taken forward to the stop point after coming to an initial halt.
T16 Open train doors Driver opens the doors of the train Station team can enter the coach with suspicious item, and passengers can
move away from the suspicious item out of the train
T17 Make automatic
passenger announcement
Driver makes a pre-recorded passenger announcement
informing passengers that the station team will enter the
train
Passengers are reassured and make way for the station team to enter the train
T18 Not close doors Driver does not close the doors of the train Station team can remove the suspicious item from the train
T19 Wait at station despite
green signal and target
speed
Driver does not move the train from the station despite the
OCC giving an automated signal to do so
Train stays at the station while station team is locating and removing the
suspicious item
T20 Move train on ‘All Clear’
from station team
Driver moves the train on getting a signal from the station
team
Driver is aware that suspicious item has been removed by the station team and























services agreement in place, the train drivers could face disciplinary action if they regularly
fail to drive the train according to their schedule. In practice, train drivers could be asked for
a written explanation if they drive the train behind schedule more than three times a month.
The importance of this goal is also reﬂected in the presence of potential ﬁnancial sanctions;
drivers’ managers could even lose a part of their monthly income in extreme cases.
The following four hypotheses were tested:
H1: Drivers will commit errors in the conduct of security SOPs.
H2: Emphasizing on-time performance will increase the number of errors made by drivers
in the conduct of security SOPs.
H3: Emphasizing on-time performance will increase the number of errors made by drivers
in the conduct of the SOP tasks that hinder punctuality.
H4: Emphasizing on-time performance will reduce the number of errors made by drivers in
the conduct of the SOP tasks that support punctuality.
Method
Participants
Twenty male train drivers participated in the study (Range: 23–31 years, Median= 25,
Mean= 25.25, SD= 2.29). They were assigned to two groups of 10 train drivers: the control
group for whom on-time performance was not emphasised, and the treatment group for
whom it was. At the time of the study the participants had undergone 12-month classroom
training in driving MRS trains, and had spent another 6-month training on a simulator to
gain train driving experience. (Range: 40–45 hours, Median= 42 hours, Mean= 42.25,
SD= 1.72). Both during their classroom training and while driving a simulated train, the
participants rehearsed various operations related to SOPs, including the procedure corre-
sponding to the report of a suspicious item on the train.
The participants were offered no incentive to take part in the study. Their participation
was entirely voluntary, based on informed consent, and the participants were told that they
could withdraw from the study at any stage.
The test was similar in many ways to what they had been through during their training.
Just like in their normal training schedule, the time they spent driving the simulated train for
the study was also added to their professional track record. The study was conducted over 5
days. Each day four drivers recorded their performance, two in the morning and two in the
afternoon.
Apparatus
All testing was carried out using a simulator at the driver training centre of the participating
MRS. Hi-ﬁdelity simulator studies enjoy several beneﬁts over real-world studies. They are
economical, versatile and have ethical advantages over real-world investigations by
providing an inherently safe environment for participants (Jamson and Jamson, 2010).
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Simulator studies have been used for experimental purposes in medicine (McFetrich, 2006;
Bogenstätter et al, 2009), aviation (Nikolic and Sarter, 2007), road driving (Liu et al, 2009;
Aksan et al, 2012) and railways (Dorrian et al, 2007; Tey et al, 2011).
The hi-ﬁdelity train driving simulator used in this study had a simulator cab that was an
exact replica of the train driver’s cabin, with the same controls as in the MRS trains, for
example. An in-built audio system generated sounds of rail-wheel interaction, train horn and
other elements from the working environment.
The simulator cabin included a 3×3 m screen onto which track footage was projected. The
software package used in the simulator replicated route length, number of stations and
distance between stations according to the layout of the real network. The virtual train was a
four coach commuter train.
The scoring sheet was in form of a checklist. The observer used it to record whether the
participant performed (or did not perform) each individual task of the 20-step security
procedure. The sheet also noted whether the participant was in the control group or the
experimental group.
1. The performance of the participants was recorded on the scoring sheet represented in
Figure 1.
2. The perception of participants on the importance of the security procedure to remove
suspicious items from trains, and the likelihood that a reported item was effectively
harmful was recorded after they ﬁnished driving the simulated train by means of a
questionnaire and interview.
The scale followed a standard presentation format used to record responses of practitioners
in health sciences (Cariﬁo and Perla, 2007; Norman, 2010). An 11-point scale with no
midpoint for neutral response was used to increase the sensitivity of the scale (Cummins and
Gullone, 2000), and to reduce social desirability bias in responses of the participants
(Garland, 1991).
Research design
The ﬁrst hypothesis (H1) was tested by measuring the total number of errors made by the
participants in the performance of the 20-step SOP for two levels of on-time pressure
on employees. The manipulated condition (independent variable) was the presence or
absence of a verbal message emphasising on-time punctuality. The other three hypotheses
(H2, H3, H4) were tested using a 2×2 within-subjects experimental design. The manipulated
condition (independent variable) was also the presence or absence of a verbal message
emphasising on-time punctuality. For H2, the dependent variable was the total number of
errors made by participants in the performance of the 20-step SOP. For H3, the dependent
variable was the number of errors made in the conduct of Task 19. In the SOP, Task 19 appears
to be the only task that directly hinders train punctuality; it requires train drivers to wait at the
station after the traditional green light, until they receive the all clear signal from the station
team. For H4, the dependent variable was the number of errors made in the conduct of Task 12.
In the SOP, only Task 12 appears to be directly supporting train punctuality. It requires
participants to increase the speed of the train from 35 km/h to 80 km/h, which would, in
principle, help drivers respect their schedule.
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Driver Number: Group: Experimental/Control
Receive passenger call on PECUT1
Check which coach number the passenger is inT2
T3 Check where in coach the suspicious object (SO) is – Front, Middle or Rear
T4 Get description of SO from passenger (bag? suitcase? size? colour? etc.)
Make passenger announcement 1T5
Keep PECU on suspend mode to call passenger backT6
Call OCC to report SOT7
Give coach number to OCCT8
Give position of SO in coach to OCC T9
Give description of SO to OCCT10
Get instructions from OCCT11
Follow new ‘Target Speed’ to next stationT12
Call passenger back on PACU to get further detailsT13
Communicate new details to OCCT14
Stop at station – not overshoot or undershoot trainT15
Open doorsT16
Make Passenger announcement  2T17
Do not close doorsT18
T19 Wait at station despite getting signal and ‘Target Speed’
Wait for ‘all clear’ from station teamT20
Figure 1: Checklist used for scoring train driver’s performance on a 20-step procedure.
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Procedure
One male train driver instructor with 10 years of experience in driving urban commuter trains
acted as observer, and recorded the performance of the participants using the aforementioned
scoring sheet during the experiment.
Employing peer train drivers as observers is considered to have a positive effect on
participants in experiments as they feel more at ease when their performance is being
recorded by someone who understands the demands of the job. In order to have uniformity in
scoring, practice sessions were conducted with the observer and three train drivers who did
not subsequently participate in the experiment. Any ambiguity in the mind of the observer
over the scoring system was cleared during this pilot phase.
The scoring sheets used by the observer had no identifying details of the participants, and
the observer assured them that their individual performance scores or characteristics would
not be shared with the management. After the study the researchers took possession of all the
scoring sheets for data analysis purposes and to ensure that the results of the study could not
be used for other purposes.
A colleague acted as a passenger to report the presence of a suspicious item on the train to
the participants. Figure 2 shows the script used to report the suspicious item in the study.
One of the researchers sat next to the observer, and recorded the time spent by each
participant in talking to the colleague acting as a passenger, and the time they spent making
the ﬁrst passenger announcement (Task 5).
All participants were asked to drive the simulated train on a round trip of the MRS line.
The members of the experimental group were told that they were being tested
for driving the train on schedule and were required to complete the journey within a
stipulated time of 46 min. This corresponded to the expected journey time for the route on
the MRS.
It must be noted that drivers in both groups had been through the same training, and were
therefore familiar with this objective. This was designed to replicate the pressure in actual
working conditions. However, in the experiment only the participants in the experimental
group received these instructions that emphasised on-time performance.
The driving scenario in the simulator was kept uniform for all participants in both groups.
They drove the train in conditions of good visibility, with no rain or obstructions on the
track, and no technical faults.
Passenger (P) (if Train Driver answers call): ‘Sir there is an item lying here. I do not know whose it is.
Please do something about it.’  
P (if TD asks for Coach): ‘Coach number 3’
P (if TD asks for Position): ‘It is lying in the middle of the coach’
P (if TD asks for Description): ‘It is a blue bag’
P (if TD calls back for additional information ): ‘We have moved away from the bag’
(Translated from local vernacular language)
Figure 2: Script given to passenger for informing train driver of suspicious item on the train.
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When the train left the third station on the virtual route, the colleague acting as a train
passenger called the participant using the PECU to report a suspicious item on the train. This
speciﬁc location, about 10 min from departure, was selected because the distance between
the third and fourth stations is the longest between two consecutive stations on the route. In
this way, the distance that had to be covered while implementing the SOP was the same for
all participants. The observer started recording the performance of each participant on a
scoring sheet after the call was made.
In keeping with industry standards, every participant was debriefed about his perfor-
mance, and informed about the errors he made. The participant was then invited to complete
the perception questionnaire, and to give his opinion about the causes of any errors. In
addition, the observer asked him not to divulge details of the experiment to his colleagues as
this could interfere with the study (as researchers would not be able to record natural
performance of other drivers).
Results
Error rates
All 20 participants completed the test. Two drivers in the control group made no errors.
All others made at least three errors. The largest number of errors (12) was made by a
participant in the experimental group. Out of a maximum possible of 400 errors
(20 tasks×20 drivers), the participants made 129 errors. This represents a rate of one error
every three tasks.
In total, the 10 participants in the control group made 36 errors (18 per cent) in performing
the 20 tasks of the SOP. Those in the experimental group made 93 out of a maximum
possible of 200 errors (46 per cent) (Table 2).
In total, none of the participants in the control group made an error in the conduct of
Task 19. In comparison, four participants (40 per cent) in the experimental group made an
error in this task.
In total, ﬁve participants (50 per cent) in the control group made an error in the conduct of
Task 12. In comparison, all 10 participants (100 per cent) in the experimental group made an
error in this task.
H1: Drivers will commit errors in the conduct of security SOPs.
The 20 participating train drivers in the study committed 129 out of maximum possible
400 errors.
H2: Emphasizing on-time performance will increase the number of errors made by drivers
in the conduct of security SOPs.
A two by two contingency table was constructed. The number of errors committed in the
SOP was signiﬁcantly larger for the experimental group (46 versus 18 per cent, P= 0.001,
Fisher’s exact test, one tailed).
H3: Emphasizing on-time performance will increase the number of errors made by drivers
in the conduct of the SOP tasks that hinder punctuality.
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A two by two contingency table was constructed. It was not found that the number of
errors committed in the SOP was signiﬁcantly larger for the experimental group (40 versus
0 per cent, P= 0.086, Fisher’s exact test, one tailed).
H4: Emphasizing on-time performance will reduce the number of errors made by drivers in
the conduct of the SOP tasks that support punctuality.
A two by two contingency table was constructed. The number of errors committed in the
SOP was signiﬁcantly larger for the experimental group (100 versus 50 per cent, P= 0.032,
Fisher’s exact test, one tailed).
Discussion
Summary of the results
The results of both the experimental and control groups show that errors are made in the
performance of security procedures, which conﬁrms that security procedures are not immune
to shortcuts by employees (Hypothesis 1). The difference between the error rates of the two
groups also support Hypothesis 2 that emphasising on-time performance increases the
likelihood that drivers make errors in the conduct of security SOP. These results suggest that
the effectiveness of transport security procedures could be jeopardised if those implementing
them are placed under too much on-time pressure. Regarding Hypothesis 3, the error rate of
Table 2: Number of errors made by train drivers in control group and experimental group on each task in security
procedure
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the experimental group is substantial: 40 points above that of the control group. However,
the result is not statistically signiﬁcant, possibly because of the small sample size.
A sensitivity analysis revealed that one more error in the experimental condition would have
been enough to make the result statistically signicant.
Finally, a statistically signiﬁcant difference was found between the two groups in
performance of Task 12 but in the direction opposite to the one that Hypothesis 4 predicted.
The original hypothesis stated that the experimental group under pressure of punctuality
would make fewer errors in Task 12 than the control group. However, the results of the study
showed that the opposite happened – the experimental group made more errors than the
control group.
Service, safety and security
Hypothesis 4 was not validated, and the test results for performance of Task 12 were
unexpected. The task required train drivers to increase the speed of the train from 35 km/h to
80 km/h. Seemingly, drivers under pressure of maintaining punctuality should have made
fewer errors than the control group in this task as it encouraged them to drive the train faster,
which supported their objective of punctuality. Moreover, the task also supported the
organisation’s security goals by reducing the time during which passengers were in the
vicinity of a potential explosive device. Given the synergy of Task 12 with both service and
security goals, the authors expected very few errors to be made in this task. In the contrary,
none of the drivers in the experimental group increased the speed of the train in the simulator.
It was found that drivers placed under greater pressure of punctuality were twice more likely
not to increase the train speed on this task. The possible reasons were found in post-
experiment interviews, and questionnaire responses.
In the interviews drivers from both groups said they were worried that they would not be
able to stop the train properly, and overshoot the platform at the station if they increased
the speed. They were also concerned that increasing the speed of the train changed the
calculations of braking, and overall handling of the train which meant that the train could
derail. Task 12 could therefore not be regarded as a task that unconditionally supports
punctuality (service goals) since overshooting would disrupt the MRS. Furthermore, Task 12
also affected safety a lot more than initially envisaged.
This study was conducted to examine whether the ﬁndings about the conﬂict between
safety and service goals also apply to security procedures. It is apparent that the problem
could not be simpliﬁed to a conﬂict between security and service, but that safety goals had to
be considered too, and that conﬂict between safety and security goals in dynamic work
environments (Nikolic and Sarter, 2007) should also be examined.
With this in mind, three possible explanations may be invoked to explain the difference
between the results of the two groups. First, drivers placed under greater on-time pressure felt
their ability to control the train was diminished to such a point that it was preferable not to
take the risk of carrying out this task. Second, they felt their ability was the same but became
more risk averse under pressure. Third, the workload that would be additionally introduced
by driving the train in such conditions was not welcome. Drivers under too much pressure
may have preferred to implement a familiar task rather than a new and possibly more
challenging one.
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It should also be noted that security SOPs are often performed with no certainty about the
reality of the threat. With hindsight, many procedures are unnecessarily performed because
of the large number of false alarms (for example, very few unattended bags conceal an
explosive device). This thinking was reﬂected in drivers’ responses to the perception
questionnaire, where all the participants rated the probability of a false alarm between ‘high’
and ‘extremely high’. Belief in credibility of a threat has been known to inﬂuence the
commitment of employees to follow procedures to mitigate it. Therefore, the perception of
the drivers that the reported suspicious object was harmless forms a part of the explanation
for their performance on the security SOP. They may have prioritized the mitigation of what
they felt was a more likely risk from increasing the speed of the train over the remote
possibility that there was an actual explosive on the train.
Limitations of the study
The primary limitation of this study relates to the use of a simulator environment for data
collection. For ethical reasons, this study was initially conducted in a simulator as putting
drivers under a false sense of urgency to be punctual in an actual train driving environment
where a suspicious item had been reported on the train, would have posed safety and security
risks both for the train drivers and passengers.
The validity of the results obtained in a simulator is always arguable since the complexity
of the real world can never be replicated in its entirety. In order to artiﬁcially recreate a
realistic driving environment, a simulator-based experiment must have emotional validity,
physical validity, face validity, perceptual validity and behavioural validity (Jamson and
Jamson, 2010). While the simulation environment looks very convincing (from the
researcher’s perspective at least), it may not be sufﬁciently realistic to generate the same
level of stress and motivational pressure (Neale and Liebert, 1986) that would exist with a
real-explosive threat. This may explain the relatively high error rate observed with both
groups.
Nevertheless, it must be pointed though that even in real-life conditions only a fraction of
suspicious items that are reported constitute a genuine threat. A majority of reports are about
innocuous items forgotten by passengers on the train (Riley, 2004; Peterman, 2006).
Therefore, even in real-life conditions the report of a suspicious item by a passenger may
not cause an extremely high level of stress in the mind of the driver. For this reason, it is
possible that the simulator adopted for this study did not signiﬁcantly affect the ecological
validity of the ﬁndings.
The small sample size of 20 train drivers was also a limitation of the study. This limited
number was because of a decision to prioritize ecological validity. In this study, the selected
participants were all individuals who were training to drive MRS trains in a context where
explosives posed a serious and continuous threat to the railway network, and had undergone
a special training to respond to reports of suspicious items from passengers on the train.
Studies with small sample sizes are, however, not uncommon in this ﬁeld as the specialist
nature of participants means that a large population is often not available.
Dorrian et al (2006, 2007) conducted two simulator studies to test the effect of fatigue on
train drivers and in both studies the sample also consisted of 20 male train drivers. Jamson
and Jamson (2010) recruited 18 drivers to test the validity of a low-cost driving simulator.
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Earl et al (2012) developed a single-pilot line operations safety audit by collecting ﬂight data
of 14 pilots from a mid-sized aviation company. Huttunen et al (2011) studied the effect of
mental workload with a sample size of 13 military pilots who performed tasks in a ﬂight
simulator. Nikolic and Sarter (2007) relied on a sample of 12 Boeing 747–400 pilots to study
their response to ﬂight disturbance in a simulator.
Another limitation of this study relates to the instrument. The procedure that served as a
basis to measure error rate comprises 20 tasks. These were not designed for research
purposes, and the experimental design was therefore inherently limited compared with a
factorial design. The effects of performing (or not performing) the tasks vary across tasks.
For example, performing Task 2 had a limited effect on safety compared with Task 12.
Moreover, each task may have multiple effects. For example, Task 12 contributes to the
organisation’s security goals but could conﬂict with its safety goals. In addition, a given task
may both contribute to or conﬂict with a given goal depending on the conditions and the way
the task is performed. For example, increasing the speed of the train may increase the
likelihood of being punctual unless the conditions are such that the driver is likely to
overshoot the train, in which case the service will be delayed. As a result, the drivers’
accounts elicited through the post-test interviews were used to make a number of inferences,
and the validity of the ﬁndings are therefore limited by the degree of completeness and
reliability of these accounts.
The fact that all drivers were new recruits and did not have a lot of real-world experience of
driving trains is also a valid criticism of the study. The strategy to address the conﬂict between
operational and security tasks could change in actual working conditions. The drivers could
make a different set of mistakes in the SOP under pressure from speciﬁc strains of driving a
real train, than the ones they made in the simulator without any practical experience.
Implications for railway security
Dörner (1989, p. 65) observed that ‘contradictory goals are the rule, not the exception
in complex organizations’. In such contexts managing conﬂicts between multiple goals
is typically transferred to local operating units that resolve them in the form of daily
decisions and trade-offs (Dekker and Pruchnicki, 2013). MRSs are dynamic transportation
systems that cater to diverse needs of millions of passengers every day (Dwyer, 2010).
Ordinary railway employees are expected to meet a number of service goals (Borrion et al,
2014) of which security is only one.
This research provides an initial investigation into the trade-offs made by MRS train
drivers that has implications for the design and management of security procedures.
The study conﬁrmed that civilian staff working under pressure are likely to make
shortcuts in the performance of security procedures. Moreover, it was shown that as work
pressure increases, the error rate was likely to increase as a result of trade-offs made by
employees. It is therefore recommended that designers of security procedures consider
background levels of pressure that civilian staff face as a result of their other responsibilities
(Borrion et al, 2014).
Railway companies and researchers need to understand that not all tasks can be easily
classiﬁed as service, security or safety tasks. For example, driving a train is a service task, but
the introduction of a maximum speed in an SOP to deal with a suspicious object on the train
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is motivated by security considerations. As a result, security procedures should be analysed
by considering the tasks and their contribution to all important goals, but also their mutual
dependencies and the conditions in which they are performed.
Performance of a task by front line staff depends on their perception of the task’s
contribution to meeting service, safety and security goals, and the priority that they give to
those. In the case of safety and security, it would be expected that the degree of risks (in
particular service, safety and security risks), as perceived by front line staff, has a signiﬁcant
effect on the performance of security procedures. This study has shown that this leads to a
gap between the design of security procedures, the expectations the management team places
upon front line staff, and how the procedures are conducted by the staff itself. Further studies
will be needed to examine the nuances of conﬂict between safety, security and service goals,
and how this conﬂict is played out in actual train driving conditions.
Conclusion
This study has shown that ﬁndings on conﬂict between service and safety goals are
transferrable to security procedures in a MRS environment. A novel ﬁnding of the study
was that researchers need to consider not just the conﬂict between service and safety goals,
but also between safety and security goals. This adds another layer of complexity to
understand trade-offs made by front line staff in meeting irreconcilable goals through
practical strategies (Dekker and Pruchnicki, 2013), but should provide additional informa-
tion to reduce operational risks.
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